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THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT AND 
TAX AVOIDANCE 
E. George Rudolph* 
C ONSIDER, for a moment, the plight of G. E. Hall. During 1947 Hall incurred a gambling debt to the Las Vegas Club vari-
ously estimated at between 145,000 and 478,000 dollars. The 
debt came into the sole ownership of one Binion, a partner in the 
club, and was eventually settled by Hall transferring to Binion 
an undivided one-half interest in certain cattle located in Arizona 
and Montana. Thereafter, Hall and Binion engaged in the ranch-
ing business as partners. At this point the Internal Revenue 
Service came forward with a claim that Hall, in the course of this 
disastrous chain of events, had realized a substantial amount of 
taxable income.1 
The Government based its claim on the theory that Hall had 
transferred the cattle in settlement of a debt, and had conse-
quently realized income to the extent that the debt exceeded his 
basis for the transferred interest in the cattle. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, first, because even under 
Nevada law, the debt was unenforceable and, second, because the 
overall transaction had resulted in a loss to Hall, and there con-
sequently could be no taxable income under the learning of the 
Bradford case.2 However, the court went on to hold that Hall did 
realize taxable income to the extent that the value of the interest 
in the cattle at the time of the transfer exceeded Hall's basis for 
such interest. The transaction should be treated, the court said, 
just as if Hall had sold the cattle and paid the proceeds to Binion. 
No authority was cited for this conclusion, and it certainly seems 
contrary to the prevailing rules with respect to both charitable 
and private gifts of appreciated property. 
At least in terms of the amount of the unexpected tax liability, 
Ernest Wilkinson appears to have fared even worse. Wilkinson 
was the principal counsel for the Ute Indians in certain litigation 
against the United States which eventually resulted in judgments 
• Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.-Ed. 
1 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
2 Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956). In this case the taxpayer had 
executed a note for the accommodation of her husband, and was eventually able to settle 
it for less than its face amount. The Government sought to tax her for the difference on 
the theory of debt forgiveness, but the court held for the taxpayer since the overall trans-
action had resulted in a loss to her. 
[961] 
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totalling almost 32,000,000 dollars. In 1951 attorney fees were al-
lowed in the amount of approximately 2,800,000 dollars. A Cap-
tain Bonnin had the original contract to represent the Indians, 
and when the contract was assigned to Wilkinson's firm, Bonnin 
retained an interest in the eventual fee. In 1938 Wilkinson pur-
chased 44. 79 percent of this interest from Bonnin for 12,000 
dollars. Wilkinson made charitable contributions of this pur-
chased interest after the judgments were entered but before the 
attorney fees were paid. The Court of Claims held that the amount 
paid to the charities, less Wilkinson's cost, constituted ordinary 
income to Wilkinson.3 The rationale of the decision is not en-
tirely clear. The court devoted most of its attention to the ques-
tion of whether the purchased interest was a capital asset in 
Wilkinson's hands, and concluded that it was not. While this may 
have been correct, it would not seem determinative of the prin-
cipal issue. There are a number of rulings and decisions to the 
effect that a taxpayer does not realize taxable income when he 
makes a charitable gift of property with an ordinary income po-
tential. 
It seems plausible to suggest that these two cases, along with 
other quite different ones which will be considered later, con-
stitute the beginning of a trend in favor of the Government on an 
issue which it consistently lost, and apparently conceded, in the 
middle fifties. Stated most broadly, the issue is simply this: does 
a taxpayer realize the income potential of an asset when he disposes 
of it in a transaction other than a sale or exchange? The distin-
guishing characteristic of a sale or exchange, for present purposes, 
is the receipt by the transferor of a valuable consideration. The 
consideration may consist of money, other property or the dis-
charge of a legal obligation, but in any event it is clear that the 
transferor realizes income on the sale or exchange to the extent 
that the value of the consideration exceeds his basis for the trans-
ferred property. On the other hand, it has usually been understood 
that a transferor realizes no income in a transaction where such 
consideration is lacking. This general understanding has led to a 
wide variety of tax-motivated transactions, and several of the more 
important types will be explored in the following discussion. 
While these are subject to classification in a number of ways, one 
distinction should be mentioned at this point. In many of the cases 
the lack of consideration is obvious, but in others the absence of 
s Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
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adequate consideration has been the principal issue in dispute. 
Both historically and logically, the proper starting point for a 
consideration of the problem is the Horst case:' In that case, it 
will be remembered, the taxpayer detached interest coupons from 
bonds and gave them to his son shortly prior to maturity. The 
Supreme Court held that the donor was taxable on the income 
represented by the coupons. This holding may be supported by 
either of nvo propositions. First, the income from property is 
taxable to the owner of the property, even though the particular 
income is assigned to another before realization. Or, in the al-
ternative, the donor realizes the income potential of property 
when he makes a gift of the property. The latter was apparently 
the basis upon which the Court rested its decision. The signif-
icant, and much quoted, language is as follows: 
"The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor 
or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his desires 
whether he collects and uses the income to procure those sat-
isfactions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as 
the means of procuring them." 
and further: 
"The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of 
ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the 
payment of income to another is the enjoyment and hence 
the realization of the income by him who exercises it." 
The idea expressed in these quotations will hereafter be re-
ferred to as the "Horst concept of realization," and the references 
will be exceedingly frequent since it provides the principal theme 
of this discussion. It is, however, a rather elusive theme, and other 
ideas will come in for consideration, the principal one being the 
equally elusive concept embodied in the phrase, "anticipatory 
assignments of income."5 
As previously pointed out, the Horst case could have been de-
cided on either the realization concept or an assignment of income 
rationale. The only practical difference between the two, on facts 
such as those of the Horst case, would be in the time that the in-
come would be taxable to the donor. If the gift is treated as a suffi-
cient realization, the donor would be taxable in the year of 
the gift, even though the income was not received by the donee 
, Helvering v. Horst, !Ill U.S. 112 (1940). 
5 See Lyon &: Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. 
Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 295 ·(1962). 
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until a later year. Since, in the Horst case, the coupon was paid in 
the year of the gift, this question was not presented. It has been pre-
sented in a number of later cases, and this aspect of the Horst 
concept of realization has not been well received by the courts. 6 
No effort will be made to consider it in each of the various types 
of situations hereafter discussed. 
Before entering upon a discussion of the cases, it would be 
well to take a brief look at the principal Code provision which 
bears on the question. Section I 00 I states, in part, as follows: "The 
gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the 
excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis .... " For 
present purposes three things should be noted with respect to 
this section. First, all of the cases under consideration will involve 
a disposition within the meaning of this provision, even though 
the particular asset is of such a nature that a sale or exchange would 
not ordinarily be required to realize its income potential. The 
interest coupons in the Horst case provide a good illustration. 
Second, the section does not require a sale or exchange.7 Any other 
transfer, such as a gift, will be within the section's literal scope. 
Lastly, however, the gain is to be measured by the "amount real-
ized," and this would seem to raise obvious difficulties in those cases 
in which the disposition does not qualify as a sale or exchange. In 
the Horst case, for example, the father's psychic satisfaction in 
making the gift would apparently constitute the amount realized. 
This is obviously a difficult thing to value in terms of dollars and 
cents, but the Supreme Court's decision in the recent Davis case8 
has apparently provided the formula, as will be seen when that 
case is reached for discussion. 
I. CHARITABLE AND FAMILY GIFTS 
In 1948 the Internal Revenue Service took the pos1t1on, in 
separate rulings, that donors realize taxable income by charitable 
and private gifts of farm products which they have raised. 9 These 
6 See the cases involving gifts of notes and bonds with accrued and defaulted interest, 
discussed in text accompanying note 28 infra. 
7 Compare INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1222, 1231, concerning capital gains which do 
require a sale or exchange. Conceivably, a taxpayer might make a disposition, of the sort 
under consideration here, of a capital asset and be held to have realized ordinary income. 
But see Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cl. 1949). 
8 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), discussed in text accompanying note 34 
infra. 
o I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cu11r. Buu.. 15 (charitable gifts); I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cu11r. Buu.. 7 
(private gifts). 
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rulings were based squarely on the Horst concept of realization. 
Over a period of several years thereafter, however, the Govern-
ment lost four cases in which it relied on the theory of these rul-
ings. In the three cases in which opinions were written, the courts 
reconciled their holdings with the Horst case on grounds that were 
appropriate to the assignment of income rationale but irrelevant 
to the realization proposition.10 
Estate of W. G. Farrier11 involved a private gift of cattle which 
had been raised by the donor. The court distinguished the Horst 
case largely on the ground that the cattle had not been sold by 
either the donor or donee, and their income potential, therefore, 
had not been realized, whereas in the Horst case the coupons had 
been paid and were undeniably income to someone. Campbell v. 
Prothro12 concerned a charitable contribution of calves which were 
subsequently sold by the charity. The court reconciled its holding 
with the Horst case principally on the different nature of the assets 
involved. The interest coupons were considered as pure income 
items, whereas the income potential of the calves could be realized 
only by a sale or exchange. Therefore, the court said, the case 
would not fit the anticipatory assignment or income pattern. Elsie 
SoRelle18 involved a private gift of land with a mature but un-
harvested wheat crop. Here the court was able to distinguish the 
Horst case on the grounds that both the property and the un-
realized income were transferred. In the Horst case, the court 
reasoned, it was the retention of the income-producing property 
by the donor that caused the income to be taxed to him. 
Following these decisions the Service, in 1955, issued new 
rulings under which a farmer realizes no income from a charitable 
or private gift of raised livestock, but is required to remove such 
livestock from his opening inventory, if any, and is not permitted 
to deduct expenses attributable to the donated livestock.14 These 
limitations, at best, go only part way in restoring the Government 
10 The fourth case is White v. Brodrick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952). 
11 15 T.C. 277 (1950). 
12 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). 
13 22 T.C. 459 (1954). 
14 Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cu111. BULL. 223 (charitable gifts); Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 
Cu111. BULL. 520 (private gifts). It should be noted that if a rancher reports on a cash 
basis he will have no inventories, but instead will deduct all expenses currently and report 
proceeds of sales as income in the year of sale. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-4 (1957), 1.162-12 (1961). 
To take care of this, the first ruling provided that the charitable contribution deduction 
should be reduced by the amount of expenses deducted in prior years. However, the 
ruling, in this respect, has been superseded by Treas. Reg. § 1.170-l(c) (1963), under which 
expenses of prior years will be taken into account only to the extent they reflect in 
cost of goods sold for the year of contribution. 
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to the position sought in the original rulings, and the net effect of 
the 1955 rulings is to give favored taxpayers opportunities for tax 
avoidance which are broadly inconsistent with the Service's posi-
tion on related issues. There is, of course, nothing in the law 
which requires that deductible charitable contributions be made 
from income subject to tax. Nevertheless, the Service does attempt 
to prevent deductions for charitable contributions of unrealized 
income items. The outstanding example is the rule which pro-
hibits a deduction for the rental value of property let rent-free to 
a charity.15 The inconsistency between this rule and the rule per-
mitting a deduction for the value of donated farm products is ob-
vious. Like1vise, the rule with respect to private gifts of farm 
products permits income splitting among family members of the 
sort that is very difficult to achieve through a family partnership.16 
By using the gift device, a farmer or rancher is able to retain ex-
clusive ownership and control of the business and still spread the 
income among family members for tax purposes. 
The 1955 rulings dealt only with charitable and private gifts 
of raised livestock, and later developments indicate that the Gov-
ernment is not yet ready to concede on the broader issues involved. 
The Hall and Wilkinson decisions, discussed above, are good il-
lustrations of this. Neither case comes squarely within the rulings. 
The transaction in the Hall case cannot properly be considered 
either a charitable or a private gift. However, in view of the court's 
determination that the gambling debt was unenforceable, it would 
seem to fall in the same general category so far as the problem of 
realization is concerned. The Wilkinson case did involve a charita-
ble contribution, but the subject matter of the gift was not farm 
products. Basically, the property was the right to compensation for 
personal services, and furthermore the services were rendered 
principally by the donor. This suggests the Lucas v. Earl11 the-
orem that earned income is taxable to the one who earns it. How-
ever, the theorem does not fit the facts of the Wilkinson case since, 
as the dissent pointed out, the interest assigned to the charities 
15 I.T. 3918, 1948-2 Cu111. BuLL. 33. See also Rev. Rul. 57-462, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 157, 
denying a deduction to a newspaper which published an advertisement for a charity free 
of charge. See also note 94 infra. 
16 See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). The problem would appear to 
be only superficially different under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 724(e), and the regulations 
thereunder. 
17 281 U.S. 111 (1930). This is a landmark case in the assignment of income area. The 
taxpayer assigned to his wife a fractional interest in his future income from personal 
services. The court held the income taxable to the taxpayer, when received by the wife, 
in spite of the assignment. 
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originally belonged to Bonnin, and Wilkinson had acquired it by 
purchase. While it is thus possible to explain both cases on their 
peculiar facts, they do seem significant in demonstrating that the 
concept of realization, in transactions not involving a sale or ex-
change, may have considerable appeal if the cases are not too 
closely related to the ill-fated 1948 rulings. A substantial number 
of cases involving different types of transactions also appear to 
support this conclusion. 
In the first place, there are numerous cases and rulings in-
volving charitable and private gifts, which do not fall literally 
within the 1955 rulings on livestock. Revenue Ruling 63-6618 con-
cerns a private gift of wheat which the donor had received as a 
crop-share rental for land. Under the regulations, a landlord is 
not required to treat share rentals as income until sold.19 Never-
theless, the ruling holds that the proceeds of later sales by the 
donees constitute income to the donor. This holding is reconciled 
with the 1955 rulings on the basis that rental income is taxable 
to the owner of the land. This analysis, of course, brings the case 
within the scope of the alternative proposition stated above for 
the Horst case,20 and makes it unnecessary to consider the question 
of realization. However, it would seem that the same sort of anal-
ysis should be available when the gift is made by the farmer him-
self, although it might then be necessary to rely on Lucas v. Earl 
also, since the crop or livestock would then be the joint product 
of the property and the donor's personal efforts. 
Eugene T. Flewellen21 is considerably more difficult to explain 
on any basis other than the Horst concept of realization. In that 
case the Tax Court held the donor taxable on the amount of a 
carved out oil payment given to a charity.22 The decision was based 
entirely on the Lake case.23 The Lake case, however, involved sales 
18 1963 INT. REv. Buu. No. 16, at 9. 
19 Treas. Reg. § l.61-4(a) (1957). 
20 In United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1957), the taxpayer had assigned 
short-term leases of real property to his wife. The court found that the only significance 
of the assignments was to give the wife the right to receive the rent, and the court, there-
fore, held the rent taxable to the taxpayer, relying largely on the Horst case. See also 
Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). 
21 32 T.C. 317 (1959). 
22 For the benefit of the uninitiated, if any there be, an oil payment may be described 
as "the right to a specific sum of money, payable out of a specified percentage of the oil, 
or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil if, as and when produced." Commissioner 
v. Lake, 356 U.S. 260, 261 n.l (1958). An oil payment is "carved out" when it is conveyed 
from a larger mineral interest and the balance of the interest is retained by the grantor. 
An oil payment may be carved out of any oil and gas interest, such as a working interest 
under a lease, a landowner's royalty interest or other royalty interest. Oil payments may 
also be created by reservations in conveyances of mineral interests. 
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and exchanges of such oil payments, and there was consequently 
no question of realization, but rather the question of whether the 
realized gain constituted ordinary income or capital gain. The 
Supreme Court in the Lake case held that it was ordinary income 
because it amounted to an advance payment of ordinary income.24 
It is possible to treat such oil payments as constituting income 
from the underlying minerals or royalty interest from which they 
are carved. However, no effort along those lines was made in the 
opinion in the Flewellen case. Instead the oil payment was simply 
treated as an ordinary income asset, and in this respect would not 
seem to differ greatly from the raised livestock of a farmer. 
The Flewellen case becomes more interesting when considera-
tion is given to the second issue which it raised. With respect to 
some of the charitable assignments, the oil and gas had already 
been produced, but payment had not yet been received from the 
purchaser. The court held that these assignments were not of oil 
payments but rather of accounts receivable. The donor was a cash 
basis taxpayer and normally would not take these amounts into 
income until paid. Nevertheless, the court held the donor taxable 
on these amounts, when received by the charity, on a sort of a 
fortiori extension of its holding with respect to the oil payments. 
While unrealized receivables have played a large part in the 
corporate distribution cases to be considered later, there seem to 
be relatively few cases involving either charitable or private gifts 
of this sort of income asset. The Wilkinson25 case probably belongs 
in this category although it seems unique on its facts. There are 
a number of cases involving gifts of income-producing property 
with accrued income by a cash basis taxpayer. For the most part, 
these involve gifts of notes or bonds with accrued and defaulted 
interest. While the Government has strongly urged the Horst con-
cept of realization in these cases, it has not been favorably received 
by the courts. Whether the accrued income is taxable to the donor 
seems to depend upon whether its eventual payment is subject to 
23 Commissioner v. Lake, supra note 22. For the situation with respect to charitable 
contributions of oil payments prior to the Lake case, see Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 
(1954). 
24 The court cited the Horst case, Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), and 
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Both of the latter are like the Horst case in 
that they involved gifts of future income from property which, the court held, remained 
in the ownership of the grantor. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), would seem 
more in point but was not cited. In that case the court held that an amount paid to a 
landlord for the cancellation of a lease constituted ordinary income since it was, in effect, 
a substitute for the rent that would have been received. 
25 Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
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any substantial uncertainty or contingency at the time of the gift. 
If it is, the donor is not taxable;26 otherwise he is.27 One proposi-
tion, however, is clear from these cases. If the donor is taxable at 
all, he is taxable at the time of the later payment to the donee and 
not at the time of the gift.28 The rationale of the cases, then, would 
seem to be that the income is taxable to the one who owns the 
property at the time of accrual, and not that the accrued income 
is realized by the gift. However, it is difficult to see why the uncer-
tainty of payment at the time of the gift should be material under 
this analysis. 
The practical lesson from the foregoing group of cases seems 
clear. If one contemplates making a charitable or private gift of 
property with an unrealized ordinary income potential, he would 
be well advised not to stray too far from the 1955 rulings with 
respect to the type of property.29 
IJ. QUESTIONABLE CONSIDERATION TRANSACTIONS 
There are a substantial number of cases in which the transac-
tions in question are neither charitable nor private gifts but, at 
the same time, cannot properly be considered as sales or exchanges 
in the ordinary sense. One of the most interesting for present pur-
poses is United States v. General Shoe Corp.,30 concerning a 
transfer of appreciated real property by a corporate taxpayer to 
20 Wellhouse v. Tomlinson, 197 F. Supp. 739 (D. Fla. 1961); Estate of H. H. Timken, 
47 B.T.A. 494 (1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944). Both of the foregoing cases 
involved charitable gifts of notes with accrued interest which were of doubtful collectibil-
ity. Compare Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946), involving a 
private gift of an undivided interest in an oil lease, together with certain amounts for oil 
already produced which the purchaser had impounded because of litigation concerning 
the donor's share of development and operating expenses. The donor reported on the 
cash basis, and the court held him taxable when the impounded amounts were subse-
quently paid to the donee, on the grounds of "constructive receipt." The Timken case 
was distinguished by saying the amounts involved here had already been earned and 
were merely subject to a creditor's lien. Compare Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 
(4th Cir. 1945); H. Lewis Brown, 40 B.T.A. 565 (1939). 
27 Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947); I.T. 3011, XV-2 Cur.r. BuLL. 
132 (1936). Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961), involved a 
family gift of shares after the declaration of a dividend and before payment. The donor 
was held taxable when the dividend was paid to the donee. 
28 Austin v. Commissioner, supra note 27; Estate of H. H. Timken, 47 B.T.A. 494 (1942), 
aff'd, 141 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1944); Annie A. Colby, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941). 
20 Stuart A. Rogers, 38 T.C. 785 (1963), illustrates the Service's zeal in this area. The 
taxpayer gave a charity a $10,000 interest, called an "equity," in a stand of timber, and 
concurrently offered to sell it as agent for the charity. T then sold the entire tract for 
a price in excess of $10,000 and the buyer paid $10,000 to the charity. The Commissioner 
argued that this, in fact, constituted a gift of the proceeds of sale, but the Tax Court 
disagreed, citing Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). 
30 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
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a qualified retirement trust. The taxpayer, as it was clearly en-
titled to do, took a deduction in the amount of the value of the 
property. 31 The court held that the corporation realized a capital 
gain equal to the difference between such value and its basis for 
the property, even though, under the terms of the retirement plan, 
it was under no obligation to make the contribution. In this re-
spect the case seems similar to the Hall case32 because, even though 
the taxpayer received no consideration, the transfer was not do-
native in the ordinary sense. The court seemed to suggest that the 
deduction would serve as a substitute for the amount realized. 
This suggestion would seem equally appropriate to the charitable 
contribution cases. The court relied on the earlier International 
Freighting Corp. case,33 involving a distribution of appreciated 
property to employees as a bonus. In the latter case the court held 
that the transferor corporation realized a taxable gain since the 
past services of the recipients constituted a proper consideration. 
This analysis, of course, puts the case in the "sale or exchange" 
category and outside the class of cases with which we are con-
cerned. While the analysis would seem equally appropriate to the 
facts of the General Shoe case, the court there did not follow it, 
although citing the International Freighting case, but instead 
based its decision on the Horst concept of realization. 
From the General Shoe and International Freighting cases it 
is a short jump, analytically, to the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Davis.34 In that case the Court finally settled the 
problem of a husband's tax liability when he transfers appreciated 
property to his wife pursuant to a property settlement incident to 
a divorce. In reaching its decision the Court considered two issues. 
First, did the transfer constitute a taxable event? The Court con-
cluded that it did since it was in satisfaction of the wife's inchoate 
marital interests in the husband's property and her rights to sup-
port and maintenance. This, of course, puts the case into the sale 
or exchange category. However, it obviously does not fit there 
very comfortably, since such characterization logically raises the 
question of the wife's possible gain on the transaction.85 It also 
ignores the likelihood that the settlement may have been made in 
81 INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 404 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(p)). 
82 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
83 International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). 
34 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
35 See Scott, Recent Developments in the Federal Income Tax Laws-A Selective 
Survey of Recent Judicial Decisions, 41 N.C.L. REv. 783, 791 (1963). 
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some degree to secure the wife's acquiescence to the divorce, or for 
similar intangible and more or less personal reasons. In such re-
spect this case also seems similar to the Hall case. Clearly it is not 
gratuitous, but neither is it a sale or exchange in the ordinary 
sense, nor even a transfer of property entirely to satisfy a legal ob-
ligation as the Court suggested. 
The second issue concerned the proper measure of realized 
gain. On this the Court affirmed a number of lower court cases in 
holding that the gain equalled the difference between the trans-
feror's basis and the value of the property.86 This proposition is, of 
course, indispensable to any of the cases under consideration here, 
when the income potential of the particular asset is such that it 
would normally be realized by a sale or exchange. However, in the 
Davis case the Court reached this result by reasoning that the 
marital rights transferred to the husband were equal in value to 
the property which he transferred in satisfaction of them. This 
made it possible to determine the husband's gain in terms of the 
"amount realized." This reasoning is obviously not available in 
cases where the transfer cannot, by any stretching of the terms, be 
considered a sale or exchange. In both the Hall and General Shoe 
cases the courts overcame this logical difficulty by saying, in effect, 
that the transfers should be treated just as if the taxpayer had first 
sold the property and then transferred the proceeds. In the Gen-
eral Shoe case the court supported this conclusion largely on the 
Horst concept of realization.87 
The problem last discussed is closely related to the question 
of the transferee's basis, and this was considered in a dictum in the 
Davis opinion. Regardless of possible inadequacies of the statute, 
it seems clear that in any case where the transferor is held to have 
realized a gain measured by the value of the transferred property, 
the same value should serve as the transferee's basis. This is the 
36 Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner v, Mesta, 123 
F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941). Contra, Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960). 
87 It is worth noting that the court which decided General Shoe had previously 
decided the principal case, holding contrary to the result eventually established by the 
Davis case, with respect to the realization of gain on transfers pursuant to divorce settle• 
ments. Commissioner v. Marshman, supra note 36. In the latter case the court found that 
the transfer did involve a sale or exchange, but that the marital rights, which constituted 
the amount realized, could not be valued, and therefore the gain, if any, could not be 
determined. The Marshman case was distinguished in General Shoe on the grounds in-
dicated in the text above. The court in International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 
135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943), relied on Commissioner v. Mesta, supra note 36, which was 
the principal forerunner of Davis. The Supreme Court in Davis cited, in turn, both 
International Freighting and General Shoe. However, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit 
has viewed the matter a good deal differently than the other courts. 
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result which the Supreme Court reached in its dictum. However, 
it is difficult to defend since the divorce settlement is treated as a 
sale or exchange on the part of the husband but not on the part of 
the wife.38 In other words, the wife appears to be receiving a sub-
stantial basis tax free. This logical difficulty disappears if the 
analysis of the Hall and General Shoe cases is followed, and the 
transaction is treated as if the property had been sold by the 
transferor and the proceeds then paid to the transferee. It is in-
teresting to note that the 1948 ruling, which held that a donor 
realizes income on a family gift of raised livestock, also held that 
the donee's basis for the livestock would be its value at the time of 
the gift.39 
III. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 
The most important group of cases involve distributions in 
kind by liquidating corporations. While liquidating distributions 
are generally taxable exchanges at the shareholder level, section 
336 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by the cor-
poration except to the extent that the distribution includes install-
ment obligations. Nevertheless, the courts have required the 
recognition of income by corporations making liquidating distri-
butions of zero basis property with an unrealized ordinary income 
potential. The recent decision of the Court of Claims in TVil-
liamson v. United States40 provides not only a good illustration of 
the problem but also a full discussion of the law. Williamson had 
been the sole shareholder of a corporation engaged in a service 
business which reported its income on the cash method. He caused 
the corporation to be liquidated and received almost 200,000 
dollars of accounts receivable in the liquidation. 
The tax avoidance possibilities are obvious. The corporation, 
because of its method of accounting, and giving section 336 literal 
effect, would never be required to take the accounts into income. 
The shareholder on liquidation would likely have a capital gain 
roughly equal to the value of the accounts.41 However, he would 
then have a market value basis for the accounts and would realize 
little or no additional income on the eventual collections.42 The net 
effect of the liquidation, then, would be to convert ordinary in-
38 See Scott, supra note 35. 
39 I.T. 3932, supra note 9. 
40 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
41 This assumes that the value of the other assets received in the liquidation would 
equal or exceed the basis for his shares. 
42 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 334. 
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come into capital gain. The separate corporate tax would also be 
avoided. 
This is strongly suggestive of the collapsible corporation de-
vice, but is apparently beyond the reach of the collapsible corpora-
tion provisions of the Code.43 Even though "unrealized receiva-
bles" are included in the definition of "section 341 assets" a 
corporation, to be collapsible, must engage in the "manufacture, 
construction or production of property" or the "purchase of prop-
erty." This would seem to exclude a corporation in a service busi-
ness, and the government has apparently made no effort to deal 
with these cases under the collapsible corporation provisions. 
Strangely enough, however, the collapsible partnership provision 
will apply to this sort of scheme when worked through a partner-
ship in a service business.44 
In any event, as indicated above, the courts in this and similar 
cases have held for the Government in spite of the apparent de-
ficiencies of the statute. The stated basis for decision in the Wil-
liamson case and others like it is section 446 which authorizes the 
Commissioner to prescribe a different method of accounting if 
the one used by the taxpayer does not correctly reflect income.45 
But this approach is not entirely free of difficulties. In the Wil-
liamson case the taxpayer argued that, if the corporation was to be 
put on the accrual basis with respect to the receivables distributed 
in the liquidation, it should be permitted to exclude the receiv-
ables which were outstanding at the beginning of the year and 
collected during the year. In answer to this the court said: 
"In any event the Commissioner's adjustment did not neces-
sarily put the corporation on the accrual basis, but merely 
affected the accounting treatment of one item in order clearly 
to reflect the realization by the corporation of earned in-
come."46 
-ta INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341. The collapsible corporation provision, of course, 
provides a different remedy for the abuse. It taxes the gain at the shareholder level as or-
dinary income, whereas the cases •Under consideration here have required the realization of 
ordinary income at the corporate level, a more drastic remedy. 
44 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 751. The difference may be the result of the different 
backgrounds of the two provisions. The collapsible corporation provision was enacted to 
take care of corporations producing property with ordinary income potential, such as 
motion pictures and residential property. However, one of the leading partnership cases 
involved unrealized receivables. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950). 
45 Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959) (cash basis 
bank distributed notes with accrued interest); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 
1952) (unrealized receivables); Jud Plumbing &: Heating Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 
681 (5th Cir. 1946) (corporation in contracting business, which reported on completed 
contract method, distributed contracts not yet completed). 
46 292 F.2d 524, 531 (Ct. CI. 1961). 
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This sentence suggests that the Horst concept of realization is 
necessary to the result and, in fact, most of the opinion in the 
Williamson case is devoted to an analysis of that concept. The 
chief contribution of section 446 is to provide a statutory means 
for getting around the positively stated rule of section 336. 
From the language of that section it might be argued that the 
question in distributions in kind is not one of realization at all but 
rather a question of recognition. In other words, it might be ar-
gued that this section is similar to those which, as a matter of 
policy, provide for the non-recognition of admittedly realized 
gains, such as section 1034 on the sale of a personal residence and 
section 351 on tax-free corporate organizations. However, this 
analysis is not borne out by the history of the subject. This section 
was intended to codify the rule of General Util. b Operating Co. 
v. Helvering,41 and in that case the Court held, although without 
much in the way of discussion, that a corporation does not realize 
gain on a dividend distribution of appreciated property. The basis 
for the holding is clear enough from the opinion. There is no sale 
or exchange. As an original proposition, this conclusion would 
seem subject to question. It is true, of course, that a shareholder 
has no legally enforceable right to a dividend prior to its declara-
tion. However, on the basis of his investment, the shareholder cer-
tainly has a justifiable expectation that dividends will be dis-
tributed as the success of the corporation warrants, and a dividend, 
when received, can in no sense be considered a gratuity. The Gen-
eral Utilities case, then, is similar in this respect to the Hall and 
General Shoe cases considered under the previous heading. 
In the case of a liquidating distribution, the argument for sale 
or exchange treatment is considerably stronger. Once the decision 
to liquidate a corporation has been made, the shareholders ob-
viously have a legally enforceable right to receive the assets. Fur-
thermore, the distribution is treated as a sale or exchange at the 
shareholder level and it is difficult to understand the logic in 
treating it differently at the corporate level. This inconsistency 
is, of course, similar to the one considered in connection with the 
Davis case. However, as a practical matter these questions have 
apparently been laid to rest for the general run of cases by the 
enactment of section 336, and our principal concern here is with 
the exceptional case such as Williamson. 
While the law with respect to liquidating distributions of un-
41 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
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realized receivables now seems reasonably well established, two 
interesting variations have recently appeared. Both Commissioner 
v. Kuckenberg48 and Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner49 
involved sales by corporations of what might properly be considered 
as unrealized receivables during the course of twelve-month liqui-
dations.ISO The taxpayers relied upon section 337, which provides 
that gain shall not be recognized to the corporation upon sales 
during the course of such a liquidation. The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held for the Government in both cases on the 
authority of Williamson and similar cases discussed above.51 
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.52 is more complicated 
and brings in still further sections of the Code. The taxpayer was 
a subsidiary farming corporation which distributed all its assets to 
its parent in a complete liquidation. Included in the assets were 
a growing crop of cotton and an item referred to as "land prepara-
tion," on both of which the taxpayer had incurred deductible ex-
penses in excess of 800,000 dollars. The parent had acquired the 
stock of the subsidiary shortly before the liquidation and, there-
fore, under section 334(b)(2), the parent's total basis for the assets 
acquired in the liquidation was its cost basis for the stock. Of this 
total basis, over 1,600,000 dollars was allocated to the growing 
crop, and over 200,000 dollars to the "land preparation." The 
effect of this allocation was, of course, to reduce in like amounts 
the parent's income upon the harvest and sale of the cotton crop, 
and the crop which was eventually grown on the land subjected 
to the land preparation. The deductible expenses left the sub-
sidiary with a substantial operating loss for its last accounting 
period which it sought to carry back to prior years. 
The Commissioner made his attack at this point, basing it 
on alternative grounds. He first sought to include the value of the 
48 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962). 
49 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962). 
ISO In Kuckenberg the corporation reported income on the completed contract method 
and sold contracts not yet completed. In the Family Record Plan case the corporation 
reported on the cash basis and sold accounts receivable which were payable in install• 
mcnts. 
51 The Tax Court had held for the taxpayer in the Kuckenberg case. 35 T.C. 473 
(1960). However, it held for the Government in Family Record Plan on the ground that 
the accounts receivable were installment obligations within the meaning of § 337(b)(l)(B). 
36 T.C. 305 (1961). In affirming the latter case the circuit court relied on its decision in 
Kuckenberg and did not pass on the Tax Court's characterization of the accounts. 
52 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), aff'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). The above discussion of 
the case was originally prepared on the basis of the Tax Court's opinion and has been 
rather hastily revised to square with the majority opinion of the court of appeals. Actually 
the two do not differ greatly. The decision of the court of appeals was somewhat sur-
prising in view of its decisions in the Kuckenberg and Family Record Plan cases. 
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crop and the land preparation on the date of the distribution in 
the subsidiary's income for its last accounting period. For this he 
relied upon his authority with respect to accounting methods un-
der section 446. However, as the court of appeals held, there is 
no recognized method of accounting which would require the 
accrual, as income, of the value of growing crops, much less "land 
preparation."53 The case is interesting for present purposes since 
it involves a liquidating distribution of an income asset other than 
"unrealized receivables," and demonstrates that section 446 is of 
limited value in such cases. The Tax Court also held against the 
Government in its attempt to tax the income potential of these 
assets to the subsidiary. However, the Tax Court did not concern 
itself so much with accounting methods, but rather based its hold-
ing largely on its decision in Elsie SoRelle,54 which, it will be re-
membered, involved a family gift of land with a growing crop of 
wheat. The Commissioner had sought to forestall this result by 
basing his argument entirely on section 446 and disclaiming any 
reliance on the Horst concept of realization. However, the two can-
not be so completely divorced, as the Williamson case illustrates. 
In the alternative, the Commissioner in the Tax Court sought 
to disallow the deduction of the expenses by the subsidiary on the 
ground that these could properly be allocated to the parent under 
the authority of section 482, and that such expenses were, in effect, 
deducted by the parent through the allocation of basis described 
above. However, the court held that this allocation of basis was not 
equivalent to an expense deduction, and that section 482 did not 
authorize the disallowance of the deductions altogether.55 In the 
court of appeals the Commissioner made essentially the same ar-
gument, but based it on section 446 instead of section 482. How-
ever, the revised version fared no better than the original, the 
53 See Estate of Tom L. Burnett, 2 T.C. 897 (1943). 
54 22 T.C. 459 (1954). There was a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Carter to the 
court of appeals' decision in South Lake Farms which discusses the problem from every 
possible point of view. The tax avoidance possibilities are graphically illustrated under 
the heading, "The Shocking Results." Judge Carter disposed of the Tax Court's decision 
by stating that he did not consider Elsie SoRelle to represent the law. He then turned 
the Revenue Ruling acquiescing in the SoRelle case (see note 13 supra) against the tax-
payer by pointing out that it disallows expenses incurred with respect to the gift property, 
and, to that extent, supports the alternative argument of the Commissioner in South 
Lake Farms. 
55 Compare Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962), in which the tax• 
payer sought to deduct expenses incurred in connection with a growing crop which was 
transferred to a corporation prior to harvest in a tax-free organization under section 351. 
The court sustained the Commissioner in reallocating the expenses to the corporation. 
It is worth noting that this is also a Ninth Circuit decision. 
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court holding, in effect, that no method of accounting would re-
quire the disallowance of these deductions. 
The South Lake Farms case, then, ended in a complete victory 
for the taxpayer. It is difficult to assess its significance in terms of 
tax avoidance possibilities. Clearly the selling shareholders of the 
old, or subsidiary corporation, were the principal beneficiaries of 
the transaction, having both avoided the separate corporate tax 
and converted ordinary income into capital gain. Had the Com-
missioner prevailed on his first proposition, these unwarranted 
benefits would have been denied, just as in the other liquidation 
cases involving unrealized receivables. Here, however, the cor-
poration was engaged in the production of property which would 
produce ordinary income if sold in the usual course of business. 
The case would seem to be the sort that the collapsible corporation 
provisions of the Code were designed to reach.56 However, the 
shareholders were not involved in the litigation, and the court 
gave no consideration to the possible application of these provi-
sions. The Commissioner's alternative argument, based on tax 
benefit principles, would only partially take care of the problem, 
from his point of view, and would be difficult to sustain under the 
statute. The case does illustrate that, if the Horst concept of re-
alization were applied to all liquidating distributions of assets 
with an ordinary income potential, the collapsible corporation 
provisions would be largely unnecessary. It is worth noting that 
section 336, which provides generally that gain shall not be recog-
nized on liquidating distributions in kind, and which, of course, 
provides the principal support for the taxpayers in these cases, had 
its origin in a case involving appreciated capital assets and a cur-
rent distribution rather than a liquidating one.57 Both section 336 
and section 341 on collapsible corporations would seem to be in 
need of re-examination. 
Section 3ll is a companion section to 336, and provides that 
no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation upon a current 
distribution in kind. Generally speaking, the tax avoidance po-
tentials of current distributions in kind are not as spectacular as 
those of liquidating distributions. To the extent that the dis-
tributed property includes an element of unrealized income, the 
separate corporate tax is avoided. However, since the distribution 
will ordinarily constitute a dividend to the full value of the prop-
116 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341. 
fi7 General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
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erty and be taxed as ordinary income to the recipients, a current 
distribution will not generally be effective in converting ordinary 
income to capital gain. This, of course, assumes that the corpora-
tion's earnings and profits are equal to the value of the distributed 
property. Congress foresaw the tax avoidance possibilities when 
they are not equal to the value of the distributed property, and 
took care of this by providing that the earnings and profits should 
be increased by the amount of the unrealized ordinary income 
potential of the distributed assets, including both inventory assets 
and unrealized receivables.58 It seems strange that Congress did 
not likewise recognize the more obvious tax avoidance possibilities 
of section 336. 
The Government has won some notable victories in current 
distribution cases. The most significant case in this area is Com-
missioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,59 in which the cor-
porate taxpayer was held taxable on the value of previously 
charged off notes which it had distributed as a dividend in kind. 
This, of course, made an exceptionally strong case for the Gov-
ernment since the taxpayer had deducted the notes as bad debts in 
previous years. While the court talked generally of anticipatory 
assignments of income, the decision was based squarely on the 
Horst concept of realization. The court reconciled its holding with 
the General Utilities case principally on the different nature of 
the property distributed, and also drew a distinction between a 
dividend distribution and a liquidating distribution. Under the 
1954 Code, such a distinction is, of course, no longer possible. 
However, it is worth noting that the Senate Finance Committee's 
Report concerning section 311 stated that it was not intended to 
change the rule of the Bank of Stratford case.60 Unfortunately, the 
report does not indicate the committee's view as to the scope of the 
rule. Other cases, all decided before the enactment of the 1954 
Code, have reached similar results with respect to distributions of 
other kinds of property. 
First Nat'l Bank v. United States61 involved a distribution of 
mineral interests in certain land owned by the taxpayer, together 
with the right to certain royalties which had previously accrued 
but had been impounded because of pending litigation. The 
corporate taxpayer reported income on the cash basis and had, 
58 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 312(b). 
59 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948). 
60 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1!154). 
61 194 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1952). 
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therefore, not taken these royalties into income. The royalties 
were held taxable income to the corporation when paid to the 
shareholders. With respect to the type of property involved, the 
case is very similar to those involving charitable or private gifts of 
notes or bonds with accrued interest.62 Like those cases, this one 
seems to be best explained on the proposition that income from 
property is taxable to the one owning the property at the time the 
income was earned, regardless of accounting systems. 
In Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,63 the corporation 
distributed oil payments as a dividend. The oil payments had been 
carved out of the corporation's working interest in certain oil and 
gas leases. The case was decided during the time that such oil pay-
ments were treated as capital assets,64 and the Court of Claims held 
that the corporation realized a capital gain equal to the difference 
between its cost basis for the oil payment and its value. The ra-
tionale of the decision is not clear. The Government apparently 
proceeded originally on the Horst theory of realization, but then 
abandoned this out of deference to the General Utilities case.65 
The court based the decision on the anticipatory assignment of in-
come principle, citing Lucas v. Earl, Harrison v. Shaffner66 and 
Horst. Put this way, the distinction between the two principles 
becomes pretty elusive. Furthermore, the anticipatory assignment 
of income rationale obviously does not square with the capital 
gains treatment, although the latter was obviously more the Gov-
ernment's responsibility than the court's.67 In fact, if the holding 
had been in accord with what the court said, the decision would 
have anticipated both the Lake68 and Flewellen69 cases by almost 
ten years. 
The most puzzling case in this area is United States v. Lynch,10 
in which the corporation had declared a dividend in kind of in-
ventory property, and then acted as agent for the shareholders in 
62 See cases cited in notes 26, 27 supra. 
113 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. CI. 1949). 
64 See Commissioner v. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958). 
65 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 311 had, of course, not yet been enacted. 
60 312 U.S. 579 (1941). The taxpayer made a family gift of amounts to be paid to her 
during the following year as beneficiary of a trust. The Court held that the amounts, when 
paid, were taxable to the donor. 
67 The deficiency was originally assessed as a capital gain on the Horst concept of 
realization, the ninety-day letter referring to it as "Gain on Distribution of Dividend in 
Kind." 82 F. Supp. 746, 747 (Ct. CI. 1949). 
68 356 U.S. 260 (1958). 
69 32 T.C. 317 (1959). 
70 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951). 
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selling it. The court sustained the Commissioner in taxing the 
profits of the sale to the corporation, largely on the grounds that 
the dividend served no business or corporate purpose. The dis-
trict court had reached the same result, relying upon the Court 
Holding Go. case.71 While the court of appeals distinguished the 
latter case on the ground that it involved a liquidating rather than 
a current distribution, it did not consider the possibility of the 
distribution constituting a realization at the corporate level, nor 
the application of the General Utilities case. However, the Service 
has since apparently conceded these issues. Revenue Ruling 57-
49072 holds that a corporation realizes no income by a dividend 
distribution of agricultural products which constitute corporate 
inventory. This ruling was based largely on the 1955 rulings with 
respect to charitable and private gifts of similar property.73 Con-
sistently with such rulings, it goes on to provide that the dis-
tributed property must be removed from the opening inventory, 
and that expenses of the current year with respect to it may not 
be deducted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The cases considered in the foregoing discussion are at least 
sufficient to illustrate that problems of realization on transfers 
other than a sale or exchange can be presented in a variety of 
situations. Most of them involve transactions which were obviously 
tax motivated, and, therefore, any attempt to generalize or sum-
marize must, to be meaningful, take into account the relative tax 
avoidance possibilities of the various transactions. In other words 
the problem becomes one of drawing the line between what is 
permissible in the way of tax avoidance and what is not. With this 
in mind, the cases are subject to classification along two different 
lines-first, in terms of the type of transfer involved and second, 
in terms of the nature of the property. 
Thus, there are private gifts and charitable gifts, and there are 
other transfers which are neither gifts nor sales nor exchanges. 
Generally, the only tax advantage of a private gift is to split in-
71 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In this case the share• 
holders received appreciated capital assets in a liquidating distribution and subsequently 
sold them. The sale had been largely negotiated by agents of the corporation before the 
distribution and the Supreme Court sustained the Tax Court in finding that the sale had, 
in fact, been made by the corporation, and taxing the gain to it. 
72 1957·2 Cu:r.r. BULL. 231. 
73 Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cu:r.r. BuLL, 223 (charitable gifts); Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 
CUM. BuLL. 520 (private gifts). 
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come among family members. On the other hand, in the case of a 
charitable gift, the income potential of an asset is realized, so to 
speak, for purposes of the charitable deduction but not for income 
purposes. Transactions in the gray zone may resemble either a 
private or charitable gift in this respect. In the Hall case74 the 
taxpayer did not obtain any deduction or other tax benefit from 
the transfer. However, in the General Shoe75 case the transfer to 
the pension trust gave rise to a deduction for the unrealized ap-
preciation, much the same as in the case of a charitable contribu-
tion. There are, furthermore, current distributions by corporations 
which serve to avoid the separate corporate tax, and liquidating 
distributions which may, in addition, operate to convert ordinary 
income into capital gain. 
Differences in tax avoidance potential become more pro-
nounced when consideration is also given to the nature of the 
property transferred. At one extreme are appreciated capital assets. 
It would seem clearly improper to tax the donor in the case of a 
private gift of such property, in view of the express provision of 
the Code requiring the donee to take the donor's basis for gift 
property.76 However, the problem is much different in the case of 
charitable gifts where an immediate tax benefit in the form of a 
deduction is realized, and where the realization of income is 
avoided rather than being merely deferred.77 As it happens, the 
recommendation on point in President Kennedy's 1963 tax mes-
sage was almost exactly the opposite. He proposed " ... a tax at 
capital gain rates on all net gains accrued on capital assets at the 
time of the transfer at death or by gift."78 Charitable contributions 
would, however, be exempt. No trace of this appears in R.R. 8363, 
as recommended by the Ways and Means Committee and passed by 
the House.79 In the writer's opinion, the proposal was not well 
founded. Private gifts of appreciated capital assets would not seem 
to present a serious problem since income splitting is less significant 
in the case of capital gain. The stepped-up basis for property passing 
74 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
7G 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
76 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015. 
77 Under some circumstances additional tax advantages may be available. Rev. Rul. 
59-196, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 56, held that the fair market value of an undivided interest 
in an oil and gas lease, contributed to a charity, could be deducted without reduction 
for intangible drilling and development costs deducted in prior years. The problem was 
raised by Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 223. Compare the provisions of new§ 170(e), 
relating to prior depreciation deductions, discussed in text following note 83 infra. 
78 1 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADM. NEWS 43, 58 (1963). 
70 H.R. REP. No. 749, Sept. 13, 1963. 
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on death is, of course, a serious loophole, but the obvious solution 
is to require the heir or legatee to take the decedent's basis as in 
the case of inter vivos gifts. 
Turning to corporate distributions, it would seem that neither 
liquidating nor current distributions of appreciated capital assets 
should involve a recognition of gain at the corporate level. In the 
case of liquidating distributions, such recognition would be 
clearly contrary to the congressional policy expressed in section 
337. And by the enactment of section 311, along with section 336, 
Congress indicated its intention that current distributions should 
be treated the same as liquidating distributions, regardless of the 
distinction suggested by the Bank of Stratford case.80 
At this point consideration should be given to section 1231 
assets81 which have a value greater than their basis because of 
excessive depreciation deductions in prior years. Before the Rev-
enue Act of 1962,82 these would have been treated the same as 
appreciated capital assets so far as the problems here under con-
sideration are concerned. However, the 1962 act added section 
1245 to the Code, and this section, stated most broadly, treats most 
of these assets as ordinary income property to the extent of such 
excess value.83 More specifically, it provides that gain upon the 
sale or exchange of such assets shall he ordinary income up to the 
amount of depreciation allowed or allowable subsequent to 1961. 
The significant aspect of section 1245, for present purposes, is that 
it provides for similar realization of ordinary income upon any 
other disposition, with certain enumerated exceptions. Among 
the various types of transactions considered above, this general 
provision would apply to both current and liquidating distribu-
tions by corporations and probably to the gray zone cases typified 
by the Hall,84 General Shoe85 and Davis86 decisions. The section 
does not require the recognition of gain in the case of private or 
family gifts of 1245 property, hut the donor's ordinary income 
so 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948); see Williamson v. 
United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
81 Section 1231 assets include, generally, depreciable property used in a trade or 
business and real property used in a trade or business. INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 123I(b). 
82 76 Stat. 4 (1962), 26 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
83 The most conspicuous exceptions are livestock and buildings. The first is especially 
difficult to understand since livestock held for breeding purposes has provided some of 
the best opportunities for trading capital gain for ordinary income deductions, the prac-
tice at which § 1245 is principally aimed. H.R. 8363, supra note 79, would extend the 
ordinary income treatment to depreciable real estate, subject to rather severe limitations. 
84 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
85 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
86 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
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potential will carry over to the donee. Nor does the section require 
the recognition of gain upon a charitable contribution. However, 
section 170(e), also added by the 1962 Act, provides that the chari-
table deduction shall be reduced by the amount of the ordinary in-
come potential of any 1245 assets. Therefore, even though this 
income potential still escapes tax, the donor no longer derives a 
tax benefit from it. It should be noted that any gain in excess of 
that treated as ordinary income under section 1245 may still 
escape tax for lack of a sale or exchange. 
For purposes of the present discussion, section 1245 is signifi-
cant because it demonstrates congressional awareness of the need 
for recognizing gain upon some transfers, other than sales or ex-
changes, of assets having an unrealized ordinary income potential. 
In this respect it is not unique. Section 453(d) requires the recogni-
tion of gain when an installment obligation is "distributed, trans-
mitted, sold or otherwise disposed of."87 Likewise, section 69la(2) 
provides for the realization of income upon transfers of rights to 
receive income in respect of a decedent, and defines "transfer" to 
include dispositions other than sales or exchanges.88 The present 
statutory treatment is very uneven, and further legislative efforts 
no doubt should be expected. 
The third category of assets includes those with an ordinary 
income potential which would normally be realized in the usual 
course of business. For present purposes, this is obviously the most 
important group since it provides most of the opportunities for 
seemingly unfair tax avoidance. With respect to such assets, how-
ever, a further classification is necessary. The income represented 
by inventory, or other dealer property, is of such a nature that it 
will usually be realized by a sale or exchange. Therefore, in cases 
87 See Rev. Rul. 60-352, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 208, involving a charitable contribution 
of a limited partner's interest in a partnership. The partnership owned installment 
obligations, and the ruling holds that the donor realized income equal to his propor-
tionate share of the value of these installment obligations. 
88 The principal problem, of course, is determining what assets constitute income in 
respect of a decedent. This problem is related to the present discussion since the purpose 
of § 691, on income with respect to a decedent, is to prevent the ordinary income 
potential of certain assets escaping taxation by the asset acquiring a stepped up basis 
when it passes on death. Some of the decisions are, therefore, interesting. Commissioner 
v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954), held that grapes grown by the decedent and delivered 
to a cooperative constituted income in respect of a decedent, notwithstanding that they 
had not been sold prior to his death. The result, of course, was that the proceeds of 
the subsequent sale constituted taxable income to the legatee; the grapes did not 
acquire a new basis under § 1014. The case bears a certain resemblance, basis-wise, to 
South Lake Farms, Inc., 36 T.C. 1027 (1961). See also Davison's Estate v. United States, 
292 F.2d 937 (Ct. CI. 1961). 
984 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
involving such assets, the Government must rely largely on the 
Horst concept of realization. To date this has been notably un-
successful in both the charitable contribution cases and the cor-
porate distribution cases. 89 On the other hand, realization, in the 
case of unrealized receivables, requires only the passage of time 
and is generally controlled by accounting methods. This makes it 
possible for the Commissioner to base his attack upon section 446, 
and the lack of a sale or exchange does not seem so significant. 00 
In order to determine the rightful place of the Horst concept of 
realization in the tax law, it will be helpful to take a brief look 
at the various types of cases which have been decided in terms of 
"anticipatory assignments of income." Most of the cases involve 
tax motivated transactions, but beyond that it is difficult to general-
ize. While many of them could have been decided on the Horst 
concept of realization, most of them were not. One thing, however, 
is clear. It is not possible to state a single meaningful rule concern-
ing anticipatory assignments of income. Rather, that phrase should 
serve as a general heading for a number of more concrete proposi-
tions, each of which, incidentally, involves its own fair share of 
difficulties. The Horst concept of realization has probably not re-
ceived sufficient recognition to be included among these, but it will 
be interesting to note how far it has gone, and how far it can go, 
in taking care of the difficulties. 
The assignment of income terminology apparently originated 
in Lucas v. Earl,91 and that case can best be explained as standing 
for the rule that earned income is to be taxed to the one who earns 
it. Attempts to carry the Lucas v. Earl principle over into cases 
involving other types of income have not been satisfactory.92 Nor 
has Lucas v. Earl been adequate in all cases involving earned in-
come. The cases dealing with distributions of unrealized receiv-
ables by service corporations reporting on a cash basis would seem 
to be one good illustration.93 Then there are the cases in which 
a person, by his own efforts, creates a valuable property which he 
89 Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); South Lake Farms, Inc., supra 
note 86; Rev. Rul. 57-490, supra note 72. 
90 See the corporate liquidations cases cited in notes 40, 45 supra. 
91 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
92 For example, Lucas v. Earl was relied on in the Horst case. But what was said on 
the basis of it there would have been just as applicable to the facts of Elsie So 
Relle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954). See also Rudco Oil &: Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 
746 (Ct. Cl. 1949). Obviously, the cases won't support the broad application of Lucas v. 
Earl suggested in that opinion. 
98 See cases cited in notes 40, 45 supra. 
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contributes to a charity.94 Both of these can be handled better with 
the Horst concept of realization. 
The second proposition, for which the Schaffner,95 Blair,95 
Horst, and Clifford91 cases are the principal authorities, is that 
income from property is taxable to the owner of the property, and, 
therefore, if a donor makes a gift of future income but retains the 
property, he will be taxable on such income when paid to the donee. 
Since the right to receive income from property is itself a property 
right, the chief difficulties in this area lie in drawing the line 
between gifts of income and gifts of property.98 As indicated above, 
there is presently a further problem when the gift includes both 
the property and accrued but unrealized income. In this area the 
Horst concept of realization does not seem particularly useful 
except, perhaps, in cases such as Elsie SoRelle99 and South Lake 
Farms100 involving the transfer of property together with an income 
potential such as a growing crop which has not accrued in any 
conventional sense. 
The third proposition, supported by the H orst101 and Lake102 
cases, is that the gain realized by the sale or exchange of a right 
to receive ordinary income in the future is itself ordinary income. 
The principal problem here is much like the first one discussed in 
connection with the second proposition. At what point does the 
right to future income become a sufficient property interest so as 
to qualify as a capital asset? As things stand currently, a carved 
out oil payment is not such an interest,1°3 but a life estate is.104 
Obviously these cases present no question concerning the Horst 
concept of realization. But, on the other hand, the stated proposi-
tion is not helpful when such rights are disposed of in a transaction 
94 See Hilla Rebay, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mero.) 1f 63-042 
(Feb. 18, 1963). The Service has consistently ruled that a contribution of services does 
not give rise to a charitable deduction (Treas. Reg. § l.170-2(a)(2) (1963)) but this appar-
ently cannot be extended to tangible property created by the donor's efforts. 
or; 312 U.S. 579 (1941). 
06 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). 
97 309 U.S. 331 (1940). 
os See the Clifford case, supra note 97, and the statutory provisions to which it 
eventually led: INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 676-75. 
DO 22 T.C. 459 (1954). 
100 36 T.C. 1027 (1961). 
101 313 U.S. 28 (1941). 
102 356 U.S. 260 (1958). See also Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 
364 U.S. 130 (1960). 
103 Commissioner v. Lake, supra note 102. 
104 McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 
826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); Treas. Reg. 
§ I.1014-5(a) (1957). 
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not involving a sale or exchange as, for a most obvious example, 
in a charitable contribution. One way over this logical difficulty 
is to ignore it, as in the Flewellen case.105 Another way is to becloud 
it by speaking generally in terms of anticipatory assignments of in-
come, as in the Rudco Oil & Gas Co. case.106 However, the Horst 
concept of realization seems to provide a solution that is, at least, 
more logically satisfying. 
What, then, can be said generally with regard to the current 
status of the Horst concept of realization and its future potential? 
In the first place it seems obvious that it cannot be extended to its 
full logical scope. That would require recognizing gain upon any 
gift of appreciated capital assets, and would even seem to support 
taxing the income of donated property, accruing subsequent to the 
gift, to the donor.107 On the other hand, from the point of view of 
the Government, it would play a useful role in cases involving 
charitable gifts, corporate distributions, and perhaps other types 
of transfers of property having an ordinary income potential. 
Clearly, the established assignment of income principles, as set 
out above, are not adequate for these cases in view of the Govern-
ment's notable lack of success in such cases in the past. There are, 
however, some indications that judicial attitudes may be changing. 
More significantly, perhaps, the 1962 Revenue Act indicates legis-
lative concern with the subject. Since Congress went to consider-
able lengths in section 1245, and related provisions, to cover one 
of the less serious problems, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
it will find occasion in the future to deal with the more important 
questions. 
Since the completion of the foregoing article, the Tax Court's 
decision in S. M. Friedman has been reported.108 The case seems 
significant since the court comes squarely to grips with the Horst 
concept of realization and puts forth a statement of the concept 
that is intended to be consistent with all its prior holdings in the 
area. That, obviously, is no small undertaking. Beyond that, the 
case seems to illustrate a renewed interest in the concept at the 
administrative level. 
1011 32 T.C. 317 (1959). 
106 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cl. 1949). 
107 This was apparently argued, but the argument rejected, in Helvering v. Stuart, 
317 U.S. 154, 168 (1942). 
10s 41 T.C. No. 43 (Dec. 31, 1963). 
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Friedman owned a number of endowment policies all of which 
would mature on October 29, 1958. His total basis for the policies 
was 60,000 dollars and on maturity he would receive 100,000 
dollars. In 1957 he transferred one of the policies to a charity for a 
cash price equal to its basis and took a charitable contribution 
deduction for the remaining value. In 1958 he made a similar 
transfer of another policy and took a similar deduction. The 
Commissioner asserted a deficiency for each year on the grounds 
that Friedman realized income on each transfer equal to the 
difference between the amount received and the value of the policy. 
These, of course, were the same amounts that Friedman took as 
charitable deductions, and it should be noted that no question 
was raised concerning the propriety of splitting the transactions 
in two parts in this fashion and treating one part as a sale and the 
other as a gift. 
The court summarized the Government's argument as follows: 
"[P]etitioner by making a charitable contribution of the 
endowment policies shortly before their maturity date has 
derived the same economic benefit that he would have enjoyed 
had he surrendered the policies, received payment thereon, 
and given the money to the various charitable organizations." 
This language is, of course, reminiscent of the Hall109 and 
General Shoe110 cases but neither of these cases was cited. 
The court held for the Government for the year 1958, relying 
principally on Smith's Estate v. Commissioner111 and similar cases 
holding that when a cash basis tax.payer makes a gift of property 
with accrued income he is taxable on the income when it is later 
paid to the donee. Friedman sought to distinguish these cases on 
the ground that the income potential of the policy had not accrued 
in any conventional sense prior to the gift. With respect to this 
the court said: 
"The theory of the cases dealing with anticipatory assign-
ment of income by gift has not been concerned with when the 
income was accrued in a legal sense of accrual but rather with 
whether the income had been earned so that the right to the 
payment at a future date existed when the gift was made .... 
It is the giving away of this right to income in advance of 
100 United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
110 United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). 
111 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961). 
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payments which has been held not to change the incidence of 
the tax." 
However, the court held for the taxpayer for the year 1957. 
The key statement of the opinion on this aspect of the case is as 
follows: 
"The determining factor was that the income was not 
received by the donee until the year following the year of the 
gift. A cash basis taxpayer is not taxable on income until he 
receives it actually or constructively. The making of a gift of 
his right to receive income does not cause such income to be 
received until the donor derives the economic benefit of 
having the income received by his donee." 
It therefore appears that the Tax Court accepts the Horst concept 
of realization with two rather drastic limitations. 
First, the income must be "earned" at the time of the gift. 
This will exclude gifts of inventory property, as the court's citation 
of Estate of W. G. Farrier112 makes clear. Second, the gift and the 
receipt of the income by the donee must occur in the same year. 
For this conclusion the court relied on Annie A. Colby 113 and 
Austin v. Commissioner.114 However, it always has seemed possible 
to explain those decisions on the ground that the Commissioner 
simply picked the wrong year for asserting the deficiency. In other 
words, it would seem possible to tax the donor in the later year 
when the payment is received by the donee. While this seems 
consistent with the last quotation from the Friedman opinion, the 
court's discussion of the Horst case and its decision in Estate of 
Bertha May Holmes115 indicate clearly that it considers receipt of 
payment by the donee in the year of the gift, as essential to taxing 
the donor. Apparently, this limitation is to apply even in cases in 
which the income has accrued in a conventional sense prior to the 
gift.116 
While these limitations are no doubt consistent with the hold-
ings in the prior cases, they clearly destroy the utility of the Horst 
concept of realization in preventing undue tax avoidance. How-
ever, it seems obvious that the Tax Court's decision in the Fried-
man case is not the final word on the subject, but merely the 
latest. 
112 15 T.C. 277 (1950). 
113 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941). 
114 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947). 
115 1 T.C. 508 (1943). 
116 This is clearly inconsistent with the rationale for such cases suggested in the 
article. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. 
